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I. INTRODUCTION
This Comment will explore the issue of incidental and future genetic
research findings and the participant’s right to receive such information in
the context of constitutional law. It will attempt to answer the question:
does a participant in a voluntary genetic study have a right of access to the
results? Thus far, there has been no case law that establishes an answer to
the question. Under First Amendment law, a tenuous “right to hear”
doctrine has been described, but it refers primarily to citizens’ right to
absorb a diversity of opinions and gather relevant facts in a political and
1
social context. Similarly, the Fourth and Ninth Amendments are somewhat
2
analogous to the question at hand, but prove ultimately unavailing. A right
to the results of genetic tests may, however, be derived from the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no person may be
3
deprived of property without due process of law.
Is your genetic
information your property? This is a question that has not yet been
addressed by the courts and that this Comment will attempt to answer.
This Comment will examine claims that participants might have under
several constitutional amendments and will analyze the validity of such
claims. It will compare and contrast the issue at hand with the courts’
treatment of seemingly analogous issues and examine possible frameworks
that courts are likely to use in evaluating such a case were it to reach their
dockets.
Ultimately, it will argue that there is a strong moral reason for courts to
establish a new constitutional right, borne out of the Fourteenth

1
2
3

J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M. in Bioethics, 2012, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine; B.A. in Bioethics, 2010, Wellesley College.
The author would like to sincerely thank Professor Anita Allen for her guidance and assistance throughout this project.
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945) (referring to a First Amendment right to
hear information).
See infra Parts VII and VIII.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

1299

1300

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:4

Amendment, that would guarantee research participants a right of access to
the results upon request.

II. CONTEXT: SCIENCE AND THE LAW
There has always been an important link between science and the law.
Our legal system regulates the way scientific practice proceeds in this
country in a variety of ways—through governmental agencies that directly
regulate research practices (like the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”),
4
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), and analogous state agencies),
through case law, which shapes the future of research and determines which
5
practices are legal and which may subject the researcher to liability, and
even through scholarship, which can comment on the law and its relation to
6
science and predict foreseeable issues. These two fields have always been
somewhat at odds because the law, in many cases, seeks to prevent
undesirable behavior before it happens. And science, by contrast, seeks to
forge ahead and pave new ground as rapidly as possible. It is often the case
that science plows ahead while the law seeks to regulate what has already
been done. A commonly cited example comes from the ever-controversial
field of stem cell research. When biologists discovered new ways of creating
stem cells with incredible medical potential using human embryos, they
7
forged ahead and broke new ground on the project, while the law and
policymakers worked to catch up and determine whether such practices
were in fact desirable from a legal and ethical standpoint.

III. SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND: GENETIC RESEARCH
One of the most important and rapidly emerging areas of tension
between science and the law is the field of genetic research. In some
important ways, the law has barely scratched the surface of understanding
and regulating genetics. DNA is the blueprint of biology. Each one of us
has a code inside our cells that determines how we look, how our body
functions, and which diseases we may develop. The code consists of
hundreds of millions of base pairs, which are molecules that are “read” in
order by our cells and translated into the proteins that make up our being.
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Our genetic codes are each unique, yet humans have the vast majority of
their base pairs in common. Small changes or mutations in base pairs can
lead to differential production of proteins, which in turn can lead to both
8
phenotypic changes, like blonde hair and blue eyes, and functional
9
changes, like differently shaped proteins which cause disease. The entire
human genome was only sequenced about ten years ago, so the extent of
10
our knowledge about human genetics is limited and still in its infancy.
Scientists’ knowledge about the genetic code is expanding rapidly, however.
The field can only progress by widespread participation in research.
Institutions compile mountains of data on people’s genetic codes and
11
medical conditions, and statisticians correlate it until they find links.
The most common way to do this type of research today is by a method
12
called single nucleotide polymorphism (“SNP”) analysis.
Rather than
analyzing every single one of the over 200 million base pairs of a person’s
DNA, SNP analysis condenses the information. An SNP is a single mutation
or change in a base pair that makes a person unique from most other
humans. Statisticians analyze common SNPs, match that data with medical
conditions, and may, in such a way, determine that a particular SNP is
13
associated with an increased risk for a particular disease.
It was by this method that scientists discovered the BRCA1 and BRCA2
mutations, both SNPs that increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer in
14
women. A BRCA SNP can increase a woman’s lifetime risk of breast cancer

8

9

10

11

12

13
14
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articles/PMC3057002/pdf/439_2010_Article_939.pdf.
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http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/mutationsanddisorders/mutationscausedisease (last
visited Feb. 18, 2013) (explaining how changing a gene’s instruction for making a protein
can cause a medication condition). Please note that this Comment refers to genetic testing throughout; however, it should be read to encompass genetic and genomic research,
including whole genome sequencing research, which raise many of the same issues.
About
the
Human
Genome
Project,
HUM.
GENOME
PROJECT
INFO.,
http://www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/about.shtml
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2013).
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available at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2350/8/63 (discussing how quality
protocols for genetic research assist researchers in analyzing large volumes of data).
What
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genome-wide
association
studies?,
GENETICS
HOME
REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/gwastudies (last visited Jan. 17,
2013).
What are single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/genomicresearch/snp (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Breast cancer, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/breastcancer (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
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Such a striking
from approximately 12% to 60%, a five-fold increase.
statistic effectively illustrates the power of certain SNPs to affect disease risk.
It also helps to illustrate what a person might do with information about the
results of genetic tests. A woman who learns that she carries a BRCA
mutation would be advised to significantly increase the frequency of her
breast cancer screening, leading to early detection of the cancer, and
16
increased survival rates up to 93%.
Detection of the cancer in its later
17
stages only results in about a 15% survival rate. Early detection makes all
the difference, and if more women were aware of their increased risk status,
they would be much more proactive about screening and prophylactic
measures.
SNPs like BRCA1 and BRCA2 serve to substantially alter the risk of
certain diseases. But there are also a small handful of diseases for which
there is an even clearer and more certain genetic link. A simple SNP
analysis can determine whether a person will develop such a disease.
18
19
Examples of such diseases are Huntington’s, cystic fibrosis, and sickle cell
20
anemia.
For these conditions, a person with a particular mutation is
guaranteed to contract the disease.

IV. WHO PARTICIPATES IN GENETIC RESEARCH?
There are various kinds of people in the United States who might have a
SNP analysis done on their DNA. The most common demographic of
people are newborn babies. All fifty states have some type of newborn
21
screening system in place, and screening of many diseases is mandatory in
22
most states.
Screening newborns for genetic disorders is an effective way to
determine whether a child already has a disorder or will develop one, and it
makes treatment much easier. In most states, after the mandatory screening
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BRCA1 and BRCA2:
Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/BRCA (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Breast cancer survival rates by stage, AM. CANCER SOC’Y, http://www.cancer.org/
cancer/breastcancer/detailedguide/breast-cancer-survival-by-stage (Jan. 17, 2013).
Id.
Huntington
disease,
GENETICS
HOME
REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
condition/huntington-disease (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Cystic fibrosis, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/cysticfibrosis (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Sickle cell disease, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/sicklecell-disease (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Newborn screening, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/nbs (last visited
Jan. 7, 2013).
In fact, all states have a minimum of twenty-one disorders that are mandatorily screened
in newborns. See id.
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is done and the results are returned to the parents, the genetic information
about the child remains in the hands of the hospital, which may conduct
future research using the DNA. It is worth noting that case law suggests that
this type of future research use for DNA obtained for newborn screening
purposes is perfectly acceptable; however, informed consent of the parents
must be obtained for such future research purposes. The degree of
information the parents receive about the type of future research to be
23
conducted, though, is often minimal.
It is important at this point to make a key distinction between genetic
testing for clinical purposes versus research purposes. Clinical genetic
testing happens when a doctor will actually use the results of a genetic test to
determine the diagnosis or treatment for a patient. Newborn screening
programs are an example of clinical genetic testing—the hospital collects
the genetic information and uses it to determine whether a newborn has or
is at risk for a particular disease. The parents are informed of the results of
those tests, and the doctors use the information to help treat the children.
In the case of clinical genetic testing, there is no issue of whether the patient
has a right of access to the results: she always does. After newborn
screening is over, however, hospitals retain the babies’ genetic information
and use it for future research. Once the information is taken out of the
clinical arena, the patients no longer have access to the results. This is the
question at the heart of this Comment. Genetic testing for research
purposes can be either subsequent to clinical testing, as in the case of
newborn screening, or completely separate from clinical testing, as some
other examples will illustrate. The distinction between clinical and research
settings is not only important for the purpose of this Comment, but it is also
a key distinction that has distinct consequences for how data collected in
either context is treated under the law. For example, while the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) regulates
information in a clinical context, a federal agency regulation called the
24
Common Rule regulates information in a research context. The regulatory
framework under which these data are governed dictates how they are
treated, as well.
Another group of people who may have their DNA analyzed is people
seeking genetic counseling and testing. This is an example of a purely
23

24

See Bearder v. State, 788 N.W.2d 144, 149 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) rev’d, 806 N.W.2d 766
(Minn. 2011) (“[T]he health department pamphlet informs new parents that [a]ny bit of
leftover blood (without baby’s personal information) may be used for public health
studies and research to improve screening and protect babies.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN
WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING 63 (2012), available at http://bioethics.gov/cms/sites/
default/files/PrivacyProgress508_1.pdf.
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clinical genetic test. If a genetic disease is suspected based on family history
or another factor, a pregnant woman or any adult may have a specific
genetic test conducted. This type of test usually goes hand-in-hand with a
counseling session conducted by a certified genetic counselor, who talks to
the patient and helps her understand the potential consequences of getting
25
the test done and walks her through the implications of the results.
A third group of people who may have their genetic information
analyzed is people who sign up for a direct-to-consumer genetic testing
service, another form of clinical testing (although, admittedly, much
different from the “clinical” context we normally associate with a doctor’s
office, and, it should be noted, not governed by HIPAA). These services,
like the most popular “23 and Me,” are usually websites that require a
subscription fee. People send in saliva samples, and a lab analyzes their
DNA for any known disease correlations and usually also conducts ancestry
analysis and other kinds of analyses. The person views all of their
information on the website, which is constantly updated when new science
26
indicates a new DNA association.
And finally, the last group of people likely to have their DNA analyzed is
voluntary adult research participants. Adult genetic research can be
gathered in two ways. First, genetic research can be conducted within the
confines of a completely voluntary research study, such as the Framingham
27
Heart Study. These people are generally healthy and simply donate their
time and information to the advancement of medical research. Second,
genetic research can be conducted on people who have come into a hospital
for a medical procedure such as a surgery, and who sign a consent form
allowing the hospital to use their tissue or blood sample to conduct future
research.
Both of these scenarios—genetic research as a part of a voluntary study
and genetic research subsequent to a clinical encounter—will constitute the
main focus of the questions posed in this Comment. In each scenario, the
research participant has relinquished control of his DNA to the hospital or
research institution, who will use it for large statistical genetic correlation
research.
However, in each scenario, the institution also possesses
knowledge about the research participants that the individuals do not know,
and may never otherwise learn. In the case of a mutation like BRCA, a
person may always go out on their own and seek genetic testing and
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Genetic
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GENETICS
HOME
REFERENCE,
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
glossary=geneticcounseling (last visited Jan. 7, 2013).
KEVIN DAVIES, THE $1,000 GENOME: THE REVOLUTION IN DNA SEQUENCING AND THE NEW
ERA OF PERSONALIZED MEDICINE 32–33 (2010).
See generally Nicolle Strand, Genetic Notification at the Framingham Heart Study (Apr.
2010) (unpublished undergraduate thesis, Wellesley College) (on file with author).
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counseling, or use a service like “23 and Me” to determine whether they
have the SNP; they do not technically need to derive the information from
the research institution. However, such services cost money, and most
people never believe that they have reason to use them. In addition,
institutions will discover correlations in the course of research that are not
widely tested for clinical purposes. In other words, the option may not exist
for the participant to go out on his own and seek the information in a
clinical setting. In such a case, the only chance of an individual learning
whether he possesses such a mutation, and what it might mean, lies in the
hands of the research institution. Whether such an individual deserves
access to the results is the question at the heart of this issue.

V. GENETICS AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES
Genetic research is a potential minefield of legal issues. Federal and
state legislatures have already anticipated some of the major legal hang-ups
that genetic research will face. That is why, in 2008, Congress passed the
Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act (“GINA”), which ensures
people’s privacy in the arena of genetic testing, and prohibits employers and
28
health insurers from discriminating on the basis of genetic information. In
addition to GINA, many state legislatures have passed even more stringent
29
privacy laws concerning genetic information.
Privacy is of particular concern in the realm of genetic research, as
common sense would suggest. As outlined above, genetic information can
be obtained for either clinical or research purposes. But oftentimes, in a
hospital setting, even information obtained for clinical purposes (that is,
diagnosis and treatment, with the intent to reveal all pertinent information
to the patient), may be used later for research purposes if the patient
30
consents.
Common research practice is to de-identify the samples, and
therefore conduct the research completely anonymously, once the
31
information is outside of the clinical setting.
However, in the case of
genetic research, de-identification can only go so far. Of course, if you are a
scientist analyzing a person’s DNA, it is of the utmost importance to know
where that DNA came from. The person’s sex, age, race, ethnicity, and all
the details of their health status are key to analyzing the genetic information
28
29
30
31

Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 112 Stat. 881
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, supra note 24, app. IV
(summarizing the applicable laws of the fifty states).
How does genetic testing in a research setting differ from clinical genetic testing?, GENETICS HOME
REFERENCE (Jan. 7, 2013), http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/testing/researchtesting.
See, e.g., Daniel Levy et al., Consent for Genetic Research in the Framingham Heart Study, 152
AM. J. MED. GENETICS, Pt. A 1250, 1255 (2010).
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and making correlations. So, while a person’s name and social security
number do not go along with his genetic information in a research setting,
32
essentially everything else about him does. This fact raises concerns about
the privacy of genetic information, some of which have been anticipated by
the law, others of which have not, but neither of which are the subject of this
33
Comment.
Other laws of a more generic quality may apply to genetic research as
well. For example, informed consent is one of the tenets of ethical and legal
research in this country, especially in an area as complicated and poorly
34
understood as genetics. In addition, basic laws about the confidentiality of
35
medical information are also important to genetic research. Again, these
are important concerns that also lie at the intersection of genetics and the
law, but they will not be the focus of this Comment.

VI. ACCESS TO GENETIC RESEARCH RESULTS
But there is one important issue that the legal landscape has not yet
addressed with regards to genetic testing—what happens to people’s
research results? In the case of newborn screening, for example, the results
of that initial test are reported to the parents and to the newborn’s physician
in order to proceed appropriately with diagnosis and treatment. But once
parents consent to the newborn’s DNA being used for future research
purposes, the information leaves the clinical arena. Any further information
that is discovered about the baby will not be reported to the parents or to
the physician. The baby and her family may never know that she has a
genetic mutation predisposing her to a certain disease, even though
36
someone, somewhere, possesses such information.
Common practice in
almost every hospital and research institution around the country is not to
37
report genetic research results to participants.
This practice differs markedly from the disclosure of research results that
are not genetic in nature. When competent adults volunteer for a research
study, they understand that the tests being conducted are being used for
research purposes, not clinical ones. They are informed that they need to
32
33
34
35
36

37

Id.
See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, supra note 24, at 64
(explaining why the de-identification of genetic information is not foolproof).
Levy, supra note 31, at 1250.
See infra note 93.
See Kenneth D. Mandl, Newborn Screening Program Practices in the United States: Notification,
Research, and Consent, 109 PEDIATRICS 269 (2002) (finding that only some states report
results to parents).
See Karen J. Maschke, Biobanks: DNA and Research, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH
THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS,
TO CLINIC:
POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 11, 13 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008).
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continue seeing a regular doctor, and that the diagnostic procedures taking
place in the research laboratory are not meant to replace their annual
check-ups. However, it is unquestionably the common practice of ethical
research institutions to report clinically significant research results to
38
participants when they are discovered.
It is undeniably unethical, for
example, for researchers to withhold information about a participants’ high
blood pressure or high cholesterol—or, in the case of a magnetic resonance
imaging (“MRI”) study, undeniably unethical for a researcher not to disclose
an abnormal radiological finding. Why, then, is the common practice in the
case of genetic information so markedly different? If a researcher knows
that a participant has the BRCA1 gene, predisposing her to breast cancer,
there is no institution in this country that would report this result to the
participant.
One could examine thoroughly the ethical dimensions of this fascinating
fact. This Comment, though, will focus on the legal dimensions, particularly
those deriving from constitutional law. Specifically: if a participant seeks
access to her genetic research results, does she have a constitutional right to
receive them?
Under what authority is constitutional law implicated? A significant
39
percent of scientific research in this country occurs by government grant.
40
One of the largest DNA databanks in the world is maintained by the NIH.
In other words, when a person in this country participates in a genetic
research study, the government subsequently possesses her genetic research
results, and almost always withholds participant notification of them.
Therefore, in most cases, it is the state itself against which a research
participant would bring a lawsuit for right of access to research results. No
court, federal or state, has yet addressed the issue of a right of access to
41
research results that are solely genetic in nature.
This Comment will
examine the various arguments that a plaintiff might use in order to assert
this right of access. It will assess the relative strengths or weaknesses of these
constitutional claims, examine the likely framework courts would use to
analyze such a case were it to reach a court’s docket, and ultimately decide
whether there should be a recognized constitutional right of access.
38
39
40

41

See Strand, supra note 27, at 38.
Hamilton Moses III, et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N
1333 (2005).
Jocelyn Kaiser, NIH Unperturbed by New Way of Peering Into Personal Genomic Data,
SCIENCEINSIDER (Apr. 10, 2012, 5:09 PM) http://news.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/
2012/04/nih-unperturbed-by-new-way.html.; dbGaP, NAT’L CENTER BIOTECHNOGY INFO.,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/gap (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Matthew P. Gordon, A Legal Duty to Disclose Individual Research Findings to Research Subjects?,
64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 233 (2009). At the time of publication, the Author was unable
to find any cases that directly addressed the issue.
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VII. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution primarily protects the
42
freedom of speech. It may seem counterintuitive that access to genetically
based research results would have anything to do with the freedom of
speech. But, while the majority of the courts’ jurisprudence has focused on
the speaker’s right to speak, there is a distinct minority of jurisprudence that
describes certain instances in which there is, instead, a listener’s right to
43
hear. Can the loosely defined “right to hear” doctrine be applied to this
particular situation regarding disclosure of research results?
There are several cases in which plaintiffs have sought access to medical
44
records under the First Amendment “right to hear” doctrine. The primary
case in which a federal court considered this analysis in the medical context
45
is Gotkin v. Miller. In Gotkin, the plaintiff wished to seize her mental health
46
records from various state hospitals at which she had been a patient. The
plaintiff and her husband were writing a book documenting the plaintiff’s
experience with the mental health care system, and wanted access to the
47
records in order to verify certain details for the book.
The court
entertained the plaintiff’s claims on several constitutional bases—one of
which was the First Amendment right to receive or hear information and
ideas. The court explained that the right to receive information is a
48
“necessary corollary” to the basic right of free speech.
For example, in
Thomas v. Collins, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that, in the case of
labor organizers, requiring registration before recruitment was
unconstitutional both because of the organizers’ right to free speech and
49
because of the workers’ right to receive the information. But the court in
Gotkin explained that most of the “vitality and justification” for the court’s
“right to hear” jurisprudence comes from circumstances in which the
50
information or ideas implicated are of public importance.
In fact, the
court cited a law review article which explains, more clearly than the Thomas
Court had, that the “right to hear” is only recognized when the following
conditions are met: (1) the issue to be discussed surrounds a public figure
42
43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
See, e.g., Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859, 862–63 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (describing situations
where the “right to hear” has been recognized); Ramirez v. Delcore, No. C-07-48, 2007
WL 2142293, at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 25, 2007) (denying a due process claim regarding
access to medical records).
Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 859.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id. at 862–63.
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 534 (1945).
Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 863.
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or has a larger social importance, (2) the speaker wants to be heard, and (3)
the listeners are not forced to listen—they may ignore or walk away from the
51
speaker. Interestingly, the court in Gotkin ended the analysis there, without
explicitly discussing each of the three requirements for the triggering of the
“right to hear” doctrine and why they are not met in this case. Within the
context of Gotkin, the larger issue is whether or not a former mental patient
should have access to medical records made about him. It seems clear that
at least the third condition listed above is met in that context. The listener
may choose to request medical records about himself, or not. This ability to
control whether he has access to the records is tantamount to the ability to
ignore the information. And, while in Gotkin itself, the state hospitals did
not wish to share the records with the plaintiff, it is conceivable that a
hospital would desire to share the records, but that a state or local policy
would prohibit it from doing so. This would amount to a fulfillment of the
second condition. And finally, it is not entirely clear that there is no
justification for fulfillment of the first condition. While a person may seek
access to his records simply for personal use and review, in this case, the
plaintiff sought access in order to publish a book that explained the
experience of a mental patient and the inner workings of the mental health
system. It is at least arguable that a record used for such a purpose does in
fact have a larger public social value. It is interesting that the court simply
rejects the argument under the “right to hear” doctrine without more
systematically analyzing it.
The issue of disclosure of genetic research results is very similar to the
disclosure of mental hospital medical records. Genetic research results and
mental health records are both confidential in nature and concern a
primarily private matter. Both are relatively sensitive in nature, in a way that
perhaps a normal hospital admittance medical record might not be. In
addition, both are conceivably of much greater value to the person seeking
the information than a normal hospital admittance record would be. A
person who visits the doctor’s office for a certain kind of pain, for example,
is usually perfectly coherent when the doctor examines him, asks him
questions about the nature and duration of the pain, and explains to him
the potential diagnoses and treatment options. The medical records that
detail the doctor’s thought process as his examination is occurring are likely
to match up quite well with the patient’s own recollection of what occurred.
As a result, access to those records has relatively low value. But a patient
who is admitted to a mental hospital may be in such a state as to be
practically unaware of the doctors’ examinations and procedures. Similarly,

51

Id. (citing John M. Steel, Comment, Freedom to Hear: A Political Justification of the First
Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REV. 311, 340–41 (1971)).
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the results of a genetic test are completely unknown to the patient or
research participant, absent disclosure. For people seeking access to
information, genetic research results and mental health patient records are
both of high potential value for the seeker.
Ultimately, while the issues of access to mental health records and access
to genetic research results are quite similar in nature, it is likely that those
who seek disclosure of their genetic research results would lose a claim
under the First Amendment. In a predictive sense, as the district court
made clear in Gotkin, courts are not likely to take these types of claims
52
seriously. The “right to hear” doctrine is extremely limited and not likely
to be expanded to something such as this, where the matter at hand seems
so inherently private. And, in an ethical sense, it is not clear that the values
underpinning the First Amendment are truly implicated in cases such as
these. Primarily, the First Amendment protects a person’s right to speak—to
53
disseminate information and ideas at will. Although there is no hard data
to quantify such a claim, experience and the general attitudes of scientists
and doctors make it doubtful that many geneticists wish that they could
disclose any research results to participants at all. In fact, a working group
of the National Heart Lung and Blood Institute, a subset of the NIH,
proposed a very specific set of characteristics of a genetic mutation that
would maximize the benefit and minimize the harm of notifying the
54
participant. Very few SNPs currently meet this criteria. If the researchers
themselves do not believe that dissemination of such information is of public
value, then one might argue that the First Amendment is not implicated at
all. A corollary issue is the right not to know. It may not be of great
significance to the focus of this Comment, but it should be noted that case
law in the health sciences arena has recognized that a person may
55
competently waive his right to know, and should be given such an option.
The right not to know, although not explicitly derived from the First
Amendment, appears to be stronger than any notion of the right to hear or
receive information.

52
53
54

55

Gotkin, 379 F. Supp at 868–69.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See generally Ebony B. Bookman et al., Reporting Genetic Results in Research Studies: Summary
and Recommendations of an NHLBI Working Group, 140 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 1033, part A
(2006) (explaining that there are certain criteria that make a particular genetic mutation
notifiable and that such stringent criteria are rarely met).
See Laskowitz v. CIBA Vision Corp., 632 N.Y.S.2d 845, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). A
constitutional right to receive the results of genetic tests would not preclude participants
who did not wish to learn their results from exercising their right not to know.
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VIII. FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment stands for the proposition that a person may
not be subject to an unreasonable search or seizure of his property or
56
person.
Although a federal court of appeals case does indicate that
obtaining blood for the purposes of DNA testing may constitute a search,
57
which implicates the Fourth Amendment, cases involving patients’ right of
access to medical records dismiss claims arising from search and seizure
58
grounds.
The court in Gotkin, for example, summarily dismisses the
59
plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim on two grounds.
First, a hospital’s
retention of medical records is not a seizure because searches and seizures
have been defined primarily in the criminal context, and because the
hospital itself created the records, so it has not technically “seized” anything
from the patient. And second, even if it were defined as a seizure, it is not
60
unreasonable.
The court was correct—even if it could be argued that
refusal to release the records was itself a seizure, it is surely a reasonable one.
But the court ends the analysis here, without explaining why exactly this
kind of seizure could never be considered unreasonable. In the Fourth
Amendment criminal context, searches and seizures become reasonable if
61
the government has a warrant and probable cause. In this kind of civil
context, it could be argued that the counterpart to probable cause is
consent. A patient entering a hospital implicitly consents to a record being
drafted that documents his visit. Similarly, a research participant explicitly
consents to his DNA being tested when he signs a consent form. This
consent clearly renders the retention of the information about the patient
or participant not unreasonable. Ultimately, given the fact that the
information that is the result of a genetic test is generated by the laboratory,
not directly “seized” from the participant, and the fact that protections like
informed consent are in place which give researchers the ethical and legal
right to use the information, a right of access claim is not likely to succeed
on Fourth Amendment grounds.

56
57

58

59
60
61

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 658 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment applies to DNA testing and rejecting the district court’s suggestion that
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a person’s DNA).
See, e.g., Ramirez v. Delcore, 267 F. App’x 335, 335 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
defendant-prisoner has no “state-created interest in obtaining his medical records”);
Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 863.
Id.
Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 291, 314
(2010).
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IX. NINTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The Ninth Amendment, which simply states that: “The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
62
disparage others retained by the people,” has been interpreted differently
in different contexts. In the famous case Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice
Goldberg’s concurring opinion refers to a right, derived from the Ninth
63
Amendment, to a zone of privacy within one’s house and home.
This
Ninth Amendment right to privacy has developed further since that time.
Plaintiffs in right of access to medical records cases sometimes bring claims
under the Ninth Amendment, but never to any avail. In Gotkin, the court
summarily dismissed the Ninth Amendment right to privacy claim as
“patently without merit” and, in fact, pointed out that the very right sought
to be protected by the Ninth Amendment was in danger of being violated by
64
the release of medical records to the plaintiffs. Similarly, in the case of
research studies, a participant’s claim of access to genetic research results
would be wholly unaided by a Ninth Amendment right to privacy argument,
simply because, while privacy issues may be implicated in genetic research as
a whole, it is not a concept of privacy from which a participant could derive a
right to access his own information.
However, the right to privacy is still extremely important in analyzing
issues of genetic information. One of the remarkable and unique things
about genetic information is that its scope reaches beyond the individual
patient in a way that other medical data does not. The high blood pressure
of one man may suggest an increased risk of high blood pressure for his
65
brother, or his son.
But this slightly increased risk or implication is
practically nil and rarely discussed. It would never, for example, be argued
that a person should not be told that he has high blood pressure because
66
doing so also implicates the privacy of his brother. In the case of genetic
information, however, the presence of a certain genetic mutation can, in
some instances, amount to a guarantee that a man’s sibling or son has the
same mutation. At the very least, the presence of a genetic mutation
significantly increases the risk of the same mutation existing in family

62
63

64
65

66

U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (describing
the “marital relation and marital home” as a “particularly important and sensitive area of
privacy”).
Gotkin, 379 F. Supp. at 863.
See Camila M. de Oliveira et al., Heritability of cardiovascular risk factors in a Brazilian
population: Baependi Heart Study, 9 BMC MED. GENETICS art. 32 (2008) (asserting that the
data collected from their sample of the Brazilian population provides evidence that a
large proportion of cardiovascular risk factors are explained by genetic factors).
See e.g., Strand, supra note 27, at 38.
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67

And so, naturally, the disclosure of a genetic research
members’ DNA.
result to a participant does implicate the privacy of his family members. Here
is where the Ninth Amendment is relevant to the issue at hand.
There is another issue that mirrors the concern for privacy of family
members in genetic research—familial database searches for criminal
offenses. When a person is convicted of a crime, in many states his blood
sample may be banked for better identification in the case of any future
crimes. If forensic evidence is subsequently discovered at a crime scene, the
police department may obtain DNA from the evidence and scan it against
the databank to identify the offender. More controversially, however,
several states allow a familial databank search as well. In other words, not
only may the DNA from the crime scene be used to identify the offender in
the database, it may also be compared with the DNA of convicts to
68
determine whether the offender is related to a previously convicted felon. A
Michigan Law Review article argues that this familial searching violates the
69
privacy of the family members who did not consent to this search. Similar
to the case at issue in this Comment, the unique and powerful, heritable
aspects of genetic information put the privacy of family members at the
forefront of ethical and legal concern.
Although this Comment will not discuss it at length, the crux of the issue
becomes not whether the Ninth Amendment right to privacy may afford
research participants an avenue to pursue right of access claims, but whether
it precludes potential plaintiffs’ right of access claims because of concerns
70
about violating family members’ privacy.

67

68
69
70

If a genetic disorder runs in my family, what are the chances that my children will have the
condition?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook/inheritance/
riskassessment (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).
Murphy, supra note 61, at 292.
See id. at 338.
The analysis is one for a different article. But a quick look indicates that, were the Ninth
Amendment to preclude a right of access to genetic research results, implications in
other arenas would be widespread and negative. It is an unremarkable and predictable
feature of family members that they often have certain commonalities. In the health
arena, it would be absurd to suggest that a doctor should consider a family member’s
privacy in diagnosing a patient with a disease that has a heritable element. In the
financial arena, it would be equally absurd to suggest that a bank should withhold
information about a couple’s credit score for determining mortgage status, because
doing so would reveal to one spouse the financial habits of the other. In reality, although
family members’ privacy rights are implicated when considering disclosure of genetic
research results, those concerns are probably not strong enough to completely preclude a
claim of right of access.
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X. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CLAIM
For the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendment claims, access to medical
records cases have been used as a barometer in this analysis for determining
the validity of each type of claim with regard to genetic research results. The
courts in the medical records cases have taken the Fourteenth Amendment
71
claims most seriously of all the asserted constitutional causes of action. In
addition, the true value underpinning the Fourteenth Amendment is
implicated in asserting a right of access to genetic research results, in a way
that the values of the three amendments considered above are not. The
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is stated in the following
terms: “. . . nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
72
property, without due process of law . . . .” The piece that is important to
the instant case is the deprivation of property. In failing to disclose genetic
research results to participants, is the state depriving citizens of their
property without due process of law? The answer depends on two distinct
factors. First, can genetic test results be considered property, and if so, are
they truly the property of the person from whom the specimen was derived?
And second, in refusing to disclose those results, is the state depriving the
73
citizen of property without due process of law?

A. Property Interest
Whether or not a person has a property interest in something is a legal
matter determined not by the Constitution, but by relevant state and local
74
law.
Cases like Moore v. Regents have conclusively determined that no
75
property interest exists in profits made from excised bodily tissues. In that
case, the plaintiff was treated at a University of California hospital for a rare
disease, and his cells were excised and patented by researchers. The
researchers made a profit from the patent, and the plaintiff Moore sought to
76
claim those profits as his property. The California court rejected his claim.
The situation at issue in this Comment is quite distinct from the issue in
Moore. In the case of genetic research results, participants are not requesting
compensation for profits made from any scientific or medical advancement
that derive from research on their DNA. Rather, they are simply requesting
the test results themselves. While it cannot logically be argued that the
71
72
73
74
75
76

See, e.g., Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859, 864–68 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
See Allen v. Egan, 303 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76 (D. Conn. 2004) (analyzing deprivation of
property as a due process violation).
Id. at 77.
See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 492.
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blood or saliva sample or the purified DNA itself is not the property of the
person from whom it is derived, the test results are a product of the bare
material plus some degree of effort and laboratory technique and
technology on the part of another person or people. And the “property” in
question is not a tangible object, but rather information in the form of
either spoken or written words. Federal courts have held that Fourteenth
77
Amendment property interests can be asserted over intangible property, so
the fact that the property in question is intangible is not dispositive here.
Absent any state or local law to explicitly define it as such, it is unclear
whether genetic test results are the property of the person to whom they
pertain.
However, in several cases, there is relevant state or local law to provide
the answers. At least three U.S. states have explicit statutes that state that
genetic information is the property of the person from whom it is derived.
Georgia’s law states that “[g]enetic information is the unique property of the
78
individual tested.” Colorado’s laws state that “[g]enetic information is the
79
unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains.”
Louisiana’s laws say that “[a]n insured or enrollee’s genetic information is
80
the property of the insured or enrollee.” And a bill recently introduced in
Massachusetts states that genetic information is “the exclusive property of
81
the individual from whom the information is obtained.”
It would be
difficult to argue, were a right of access to genetic research results claim
brought in either Georgia, Colorado, or Louisiana, that the Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process upon deprivation of property was not
implicated. Property rights derive from state law, and these laws set out
clearly and explicitly both that genetic information is property, and that it
belongs to the tested individual.
There is one case that an opponent of right to access might use to refute
the clear property interest asserted by the laws of these three states:
82
Washington University v. Catalona.
In Washington, the court of appeals
confronted the issue of whether donors of biospecimens “retain an
ownership interest allowing the individuals to direct or authorize the
83
84
transfer of such materials to a third party.” The court’s answer was no.
77
78
79
80
81

82
83
84

See, e.g., Davila Lopes v. Soler-Zapata, 916 F. Supp. 118, 119–20 (D.P.R. 1996).
GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (2005).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7 (West 1994).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1023 (1997).
Press Release, Forum on Genetic Equity, Landmark Genetic Privacy Bill Introduced on
Beacon Hill (2011), available at http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
pageDocuments/5I6QWJYJTE.pdf.
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 673.
Id. at 676–77.
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This case constitutes compelling evidence that courts are reluctant to assign
a property interest in biological tissues or in the products derived from
them. Of course, the situation in the instant case is quite different, as the
property right being asserted is over information rather than the biological
tissue itself. Nonetheless, Washington and cases like it represent the greatest
threat to assigning property rights in genetic information for the purposes
of Fourteenth Amendment analysis.
In New Jersey, the legislature attempted to pass a law similar to the
85
statutes of Georgia, Louisiana, and Colorado, but the Governor vetoed it.
The Governor wrote a lengthy conditional veto message, which explained
86
the consequences of creating a property right in genetic information. The
Governor wrote that the establishment of a new property right in genetic
information would amount to a major shift from current practice, and that it
87
would have chilling effects on research practices.
She enumerated two
primary concerns. First, she expressed worry over the potential litigation
that would ensue when participants sought royalties or compensation for
88
any profits derived from research on their DNA. And second, she worried
that “creating a property right would impose a de facto requirement that
researchers notify anyone whose genetic information was used or is intended
89
to be used in the course of research.” Current practice dictates that when
a person donates her DNA to research, the researchers store it in a biobank,
like the NIH database, dbGap. Subsequently, any researcher who requests
90
access may use the information in the biobank for his or her own study.
The Governor of New Jersey, in vetoing a bill to make genetic information
the property of the donor, feared that every time a researcher wanted to use
the data in the biobank, the participant would have to be notified. This is a
strange and unfounded concern. There exists a well-developed system of
informed consent in all research, particularly genetic. When a participant
donates DNA to a biobank, the informed consent appropriately notifies the
participant of the context and types of research that her DNA may assist.
Because of the role of waiver and consent in the process, even if the
information were considered property of the person who donated the
specimen, such a designation would not preclude its unrestricted use for any
of the projects that the participant was informed might be taking place. In
85
86
87
88
89
90

Letter from Gov. Christine Todd Whitman to N.J. Senate (Sept. 19, 1996) (on file with
N.J. Office of Legis. Servs.).
Id.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Maschke, supra note 37, at 11–12; dbGaP: GENOTYPES and PHENOTYPES, NAT’L CENTER
BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO., http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/projects/gap/cgi-bin/about.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2013).
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fact, a designation of genetic information as property affords its owner much
91
greater control over its use in various contexts.
So is there any merit to the New Jersey Governor’s argument? Since only
a handful of states have considered making a law that would designate
genetic information as property, it can be safely assumed that doing so is not
a popular concept. Perhaps legislatures in other states have concerns similar
to the concerns expressed in New Jersey. However, the consequence with
the greatest potential impact would be the implications for Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights. If the information is the property of the
92
participant, then the participant should be able to ask for it back.
Currently, federal regulation requires participants be given the opportunity
to withdraw consent and remove their DNA and information from a biobank
93
at any time. But while withdrawing the information deprives the institution
of the property, it does not, strictly speaking, return the property to its owner.
Scholars have weighed in as well on whether genetic information should
be considered property. For example, Catherine Valerio Barrad describes
the various common law elements of a property interest and explains that
94
genetic information in fact shares each of these elements.
Catherine
Valerio Barrad is one author, among others, who describes the features of
property ownership, including exclusive possession, control over use,
95
alienability and devisability. She goes on to explain how, at one point or
another, the person to whom the genetic information pertains does enjoy all
of these rights in it, thus fitting into the common law picture of property
ownership. In addition, she uses the Restatement of Property and its
description of various types of property ownership to assert that genetic
96
information fits the definition of property as it was formally understood.
Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, in another article on the subject, appeals to a
moral sensibility, rather than a legal one, in asserting that genetic
97
information should be considered property.
He describes the potential

91

92

93
94
95
96
97

See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-I:1 (2011) (providing that, in New Hampshire, individuals
have a property interest in the information in their medical records and are thus entitled
to that information upon request).
See Catherine M. Valerio Barrad, Genetic Information and Property Theory, 87 NW. U. L. REV.
1037, 1058–59, 1086 (1993) (arguing for the recognition of protectable property interests
in genetic information).
Informed Consent Elements Tailored to Genomics Research, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST.,
http://www.genome.gov/27026589 (last updated May 19, 2012).
Barrad, supra note 92, at 1040.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1053.
See Jeffery Lawrence Weeden, Genetic Liberty, Genetic Property: Protecting Genetic Information,
4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 611, 616 (2006) (arguing that recognition of genetic information as
protectable property “would exclude others from taking, using, receiving, selling, or
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pitfalls and abuses of the recent explosion in scientific knowledge about
genetic information, and explains that an individual’s liberty with regards to
his DNA is best protected not under a privacy regime, but under a property
98
regime.
The author argues that privacy law is an ever-changing and
unstable force, and that property law by contrast is rigid and wellestablished. Therefore, he claims, categorizing genetic information as
99
property affords citizens greater protection under the law.
By contrast, Professor Sonia Suter argues that the privacy regime is
perfectly adequate to protect genetic research participants, and that moving
to a property regime strips the medical research process of its tenets of trust
100
and affords it instead a sense of commodification and disaggregation.
For the purposes of this Comment, the analysis will proceed assuming
that the right of access claim to genetic research is being asserted in either
Louisiana, Colorado, or Georgia. Genetic information being considered
property is not enough for a plaintiff to prevail. A court would further
continue to the due process analysis.

B. Deprivation Without Due Process
If there is an established property right in genetic information, what
process is due to a research participant who requests that information? Due
process analysis has been conducted differently by different courts, and is
largely a subjective evaluation that depends on how important and
101
fundamental the right is that has been deprived.
Is informed consent
itself enough “due process” to deprive the participant of her own property?
What is clear is that the right being sought is extremely important. A
right of control over your own being, bodily integrity, and autonomy is a
right that has been enumerated in many court cases throughout different
102
types of disciplines and issues.
Access to information about your genetic
code is not as directly related to bodily integrity as some other concerns,
particularly control over medical treatment and procedures. But, notably,

98
99
100
101

102

otherwise misusing an individual’s genetic information without the express consent of the
owner”).
Id. at 617.
Id. at 661–62.
Sonia M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Genetic
Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 737, 798 (2004).
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (“[W]e have regularly
observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition . . . .”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing that a
competent person holds a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment under
the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
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the information is one step on the way to better control over your body.
Without all of the relevant information, how can we make the best and most
informed personal choices? Some people would argue that, even with all of
the information that genetic testing could offer, people’s behaviors and
practices will hardly change. Art Caplan, for instance, writes that people
know they should not smoke, and they know they should bring their weight
103
down, but ultimately not much has changed.
It is not our place, though,
as lawmakers and policymakers, to decide whether people will do the right
thing with the information we give them. We place a high value on allowing
people to make their own decisions. Whenever government tries to
paternalistically prevent information from being disseminated, courts frown
104
upon the practice and strike down laws that tend toward such a result.
Ultimately, whether a person should be allowed to completely waive his right
to genetic information about himself should depend on how important that
information might be. And the truth is: the information could be the
difference between life and death.
If a court were to hear a right of access to genetic information case, in a
state where genetic information was considered property, they would be
hard pressed to hold that informed consent is enough due process to
deprive a person of that property. The biggest hurdle for such a plaintiff to
overcome would be the simple designation of genetic information as
property. But there is one other avenue of Fourteenth Amendment analysis
that a plaintiff could ask the court to employ: the new fundamental right.

C. New Fundamental Right
Plaintiffs in several cases have attempted to create a new fundamental
right in something, where no property right or other claim can be
105
articulated.
This type of claim is a long shot, to say the least. A plaintiff
using this reasoning would have to argue that the right to information that
could change the course of medical treatment, resulting in the difference
between life and death, is so fundamental as to deserve the independent
protection of the Constitution. In accepting this logic, a court would be
happy to avoid the messy and controversial issue of calling genetic
information property, which may have unintended consequences, as the

103

104
105

Art Caplan, Will knowing your DNA motivate you to lose weight?, VITALS (Jan. 10, 2012, 7:00
PM),
http://vitals.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/01/10/10098646-will-knowing-your-dnamotivate-you-to-lose-weight?.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–
65 (1976) (characterizing the free flow of information as indispensible).
See, e.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705–06, 708 (refusing to recognize a liberty interest in
assisted suicide).
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106

But courts are extremely reluctant to
Governor of New Jersey articulated.
recognize new fundamental rights. The most analogous case in which a
plaintiff attempted to argue this logic was Abigail Alliance for Better Access to
107
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach.
In this case, the court ruled that
terminally ill adult patients have no fundamental due process right of access
to investigational drugs not yet approved by the FDA regardless of the drug’s
108
potential life-saving properties.
On the one hand, it seems at first glance that if a court refused to create
a fundamental right of access to life-saving drugs, it would be even less apt to
create one for potentially life-saving information. However, in looking more
closely at the court’s analysis in Abigail Alliance, it becomes clear that the
primary focus was on whether this country has a long history of protecting
the right now claimed to be fundamental. The court in Abigail Alliance
explains that the government has expressed a strong interest in regulating
109
drugs and access to them in the interest of the overall safety of its citizens.
In other words, the government’s interest in regulating drug use and in
assuring safety before any drug is released to the market trumps the right of
one person’s access to a potentially life-saving drug that has not yet been
approved. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the government has
a long history of expressed interest in withholding information from its citizens. It certainly does not have a history of expressed interest in withholding information from citizens about themselves. In fact, we are an information
nation.
Our society is centered around providing information and
maintaining transparency, allowing citizens to make autonomous wellinformed decisions. There is a potential that, despite the contradictory
holding in Abigail Alliance, a court would find a new fundamental right of
access to genetic information. However, it is more likely that a court will
find a property interest in genetic information and proceed with the aboveoutlined Fourteenth Amendment analysis.

XI. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND OBJECTIONS
One major concern about this proposed right to receive the results of
genetic research is the burden it places on the (usually state-based, and
therefore potentially under-budgeted) institutions that possess the
information. With the disclosure of any medical information, there are
106
107
108
109

Letter from Governor Christine Todd Whitman to N.J. Senate, supra note 85.
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
Id. at 697, 712.
See id. at 711 (“[O]ur Nation’s history evidences increasing regulation of drugs as both
the ability of government to address these risks has increased and the risks associated with
drugs have become apparent.”).
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certain safeguards that must be in place. For example, research institutions
will likely grapple with whether or not specific geneticists, internists, or
genetic counselors would need to be assigned to do the notifying. If new
staff needs to be hired simply for the purpose of notifying participants of
research findings, that requirement could place a significant burden on
hospitals and research institutes. In addition, systems must be in place to reidentify DNA and match it up accurately with its “owner.”
Such
administrative and structural concerns, while not overly burdensome, would
certainly be a consideration for those who conduct genetic research.
In addition, if the road towards establishing this kind of right of access
proceeds in the most likely manner, by classifying genetic information as the
property of its donor, several unintended consequences might result. The
New Jersey Governor who vetoed such a genetic property bill elucidated a
110
few of these concerns.
But it is impossible to conceive of all of the
potential consequences of such a statute. One benefit of the alternative to
establishing a right of access, the new fundamental right, is that it avoids
classifying genetic information as property in an absolute sense, and focuses
instead on the issue at hand in the described situation.
Of the utmost importance is maintaining the ease and wide participation
111
of large-scale genetic research studies , because personalizing diagnosis
and treatment and individually assessing disease risk are the future of
medicine. If establishing a right of access to research results would
unnecessarily bog down research efforts or burden hospitals or state
research institutions, then doing so may be ultimately counterproductive.
Finally, should it become the common practice of researchers and
institutions to return genetic research results, it is likely that they will find a
legal basis for such a practice not in the Constitution, but instead in federal
and state regulation which could center around privacy doctrine, contract
law, or another legal theory. The Constitution could be a powerful tool in
court to argue for such a right, however, it is unlikely to be the ultimate
driver of change in the practice of returning genetic research results.

XII. CONCLUSION
It is probable that a change in the landscape of genetic research is on
the horizon. There is a strong sense, driven by ethics, justice, and American
societal norms, that withholding potentially life-saving information from
voluntary research participants is wrong. Up until now, the researchers who
work on large-scale genetic research have been hesitant to see it as a project

110
111

Letter from Gov. Christine Todd Whitman to N.J. Senate, supra note 85.
See PRIVACY AND PROGRESS IN WHOLE GENOME SEQUENCING, supra note 24.
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focusing on the individual patient. While dreams of personalized genomic
medicine have been in our minds since watching movies like GATTACA over
fifteen years ago, scientists have always known that such dreams are decades
away from becoming a reality. Accordingly, they have viewed their research
as pertinent only to large groups of people. They are statisticians, driven by
the largest possible numbers to find broad sweeping correlations that might
direct further study. And they are right, in some sense. We don’t know
enough, yet, about how genetics works to use it as a part of individual
diagnostic processes. We are not prepared to say exactly how much more
often a woman with a BRCA mutation should go in for a mammogram, or
exactly how much value exists in the knowledge of the mutation. But
hesitation on the part of scientists amounts to paternalism and withholding
of information with which people might make important life-altering
decisions.
In short, genetic researchers’ hesitancy to disclose research results to
participants is understandable, and to do so now would be a little bit
premature. But it will not be long before one of the plaintiffs described in
this Comment starts filing his lawsuit. Americans demand information from
their government.
The Constitution is meant to protect our most
fundamental civil liberties. What could be more fundamental than the right
to choose how to live; the right to choose the information we gather, how we
process that information, and what we do with it; the right to direct our
medical treatment using the absolute best resources we have at our disposal?
So the question is: how will a court react when this case reaches its
docket? Hopefully, the analysis provided above gives a taste for the claims
likely to be considered. Ultimately, the constitutional claim on which a
plaintiff is most likely to succeed is a claim arising out of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Failure to disclose the results of a
genetic test in the course of research amounts to a deprivation of property
without due process of law.

